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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
debatable question, one not presented in the instant case, is the effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment upon national liquor legislation enacted before
the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. W. M., '36.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORD.-In a personal
injuries suit it was attempted to introduce as evidence the plaintiff's hospital
record, consisting of entries made by doctors, internes and nurses. Ad-
mitting the abstract admissibility of such evidence on the analogy of entries
made in the regular course of business, the court excluded the instant record
because it was not shown to have been made under the supervision of a
physician qualified to give expert testimony. Paxos v. Jarka Corporation
(Pa. 1934) 171 Atl. 468.
Considerations of logic and expedience would seem to demand that hospital
and insane asylum records be peculiarly favored exceptions to the hearsay
rule; they are "entries in the regular course of business"; the dual require-
ments of necessity and trustworthiness are conspicuously present: such
records are commonly a composite of the observations of persons too numer-
ous to be called from their hospital duties to testify as to easily forgotten
matters of daily routine; they represent scientific data, far more impartial
than many more favored forms of evidence. 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923)
par. 1707. A few jurisdictions favor this view. Ribas v. Revere Rubber
Co. (1914) 37 R. I. 189, 91 Atl. 58; Boss v. Illinois Central Ry. Co. (1921) 221
Ill. App. 504. Most courts, however, have been extremely chary in admitting
such records. Some avowedly reject. In re Hock's Will (1911) 129 N. Y. S.
196 Harkness v. Borough of Swissvale (1913) 238 Pa. 544, 86 Atl. 478;
Jordan v. Apter (1919) 93 Conn. 302, 105 AtI. 620. Others, as in the instant
case, honor the rule by way of dictum but manage to find technical excuses
to relieve them from applying it. Lack of necessity is frequently invoked.
Osborne v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 AtI. 512. Where the
superintendent of a hospital made regular case entries based on doctors' re-
ports, and vouched for their authenticity, the entries were rejected because
not made by an actual observer of the patient. Price v. Standard Life &
Acc. Inc. Co. (1903) 90 Minn. 264, 95 N. W. 1118. It was elsewhere inti-
mated that such second-hand reports would be admissible in cases of neces-
sity, but, significantly, the court did not find such necessity present. De-
laney v. Framingham Gas Fuel Co. (1909) 202 Mass. 359, 88 N. E. 773. This
latter dictum seems correct in light of the frequency with which hospital
records are compiled from a series of first-hand reports, by one who has not
observed the actual case. Properly upholding their admission see Ribas v.
Revere Rubber Co., supra. The holding of the instant case is not altogether
blameless of sophistry; it would seem that case data regularly made by a
hospital staff should fulfill the requirements of expert testimony whether or
not the actual supervision of a physician is shown. For this general sub-ject see 1 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par. 569.
The findings of official boards of health present similar problems; here the
same narrow policy is pursued. A laboratory analysis of sputum made by
a state board of health was rejected in Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1916) 224 Mass. 6, 112 N. E. 612. The finding of a board of draft examiners
during the World War has been ingeniously excluded as an ex parte pro-
ceeding. Laird v. Boston & M. Ry. Co. (N. H. 1921) 114 Atl. 275. Contra see
Casey v. Kennedy (1920) 52 D. L. R. 326.
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Where, however, the making of entries is a duty imposed by law they
automatically become admissible as public records. This distinction is re-
sponsible for the exclusion of insane asylum records in State v. Tarwater
(1922) 293 Mo. 273, 239 S. W. 480, and their admission in Hempton v. State
(1901) 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596. See Galli v. Wells (1922) 209 Mo. App.
460, 239 S. W. 894, where a record of a city hospital was admitted because of
a city ordinance requiring it to be kept.
Impelled by judicial unwillingness to cope with the problem on common law
principles, several states have by statute made hospital and asylum records
admissible. Massachusetts, Gen. L., 1920, c. 233, par. 79; New York, Cons.
L., 1909, Insanity, par. 93. Missouri confines admissibility to proceedings
under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, R. S. Mo. (1929) 3311.
C. B. P., '35.
INSURANCE-DEATH By ACCIDENTAL MEANS-SUNSTROKE.-The insured,
in good health and physical condition, while playing golf on a moderately
hot day, suffered a sunstroke from which he died. Held on demurrer: his
death did not result "directly and independently of all other causes from
bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means" so
as to permit recovery on accident and double indemnity life insurance policies.
Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1934) 54 S. Ct. 461.
Decisions as to whether death from sunstroke while engaged in ordinary
occupations falls within the category of death by accidental means are in
sharp conflict, evidenced by the dissent of Cardozo, J., in the present case.
And the distinction between accidental means and accidental result, though
generally recognized, has not always been followed, some cases holding that
when an accident in the popular sense and understanding of the ordinary
layman has occurred, it is within a policy insuring against injury by acci-
dental means, regardless of cause or effect. Gallagher v. Fidelity and Casu-
alty Co. (1914) 163 App. Div. 556, 148 N. Y. S. 1016, affirmed (1917) 221
N. Y. 664, 117 N. E. 1067; Lewis v. Ocean Navigation Corp. (1918) 224
N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56; Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co. (1916) 107 Tex.
582, 182 S. W. 673, overruling (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) 145 S. W. 636. An-
other doctrine which allows the plaintiff to recover in the absence of excep-
tional circumstances is based on the theory that an unintended effect which
is not the natural and probable consequence of the insured's course of action
is produced by accidental means. Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.
(1921) 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017; Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co. (1916)
170 Ky. 47, 185 S. W. 496; Continental Casualty Co. v. Clark (1918) 70 Ok.
187, 173 Pac. 453; Tate v. Benefit Association of Railway Employees (1932)
186 Minn. 538, 243 N. W. 694; see Western Commercial Travelers' Associa-
tion v. Smith (C. C. A. 8, 1898) 85 F. 401; Note (1932) 20 Geo. L. Rev. 512.
On the other hand, sunstroke is a pathological condition equivalent to a dis-
ease, and so is neither an accidental injury nor one produced by accidental
means. Sinclair v. Maritime Pass. Assurance Co. (1861) 3 El. & El. 476,
121 Eng. Repr. 521; Dozier v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo.
1891) 46 F. 446. Other decisions deny recovery following the rule laid down
in U. S. Mutual Accident Association v. Barry (1889) 131 U. S. 100, that
there must be some unforeseen, unexpected occurrence (having a direct
causal relation to the injury) in the act which produced it; and where the
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